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FEDERAL JURISDICTION 
SULLIVAN v. FIRST AFFILIATED 
SECURITIES: WHEN WILL THE "ARTFUL 
PLEADING DOCTRINE" SUPPORT 
REMOVAL OF A STATE CLAIM TO 
FEDERAL COURT? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Sullivan v. First Affiliated Securities, l the Ninth Circuit 
interpreted the U. S. Supreme Court's application of the artful 
pleading doctrine in Federated Department Stores v. Moitie2 
and reviewed the Ninth Circuit's earlier application of the artful 
pleading doctrine in Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Asso-
ciation.3 The Ninth Circuit concluded that where a plaintiff has 
filed parallel securities actions in federal court and in state 
court, and where the state claim is not precluded by the res judi-
cata effect of a federal judgment, the defendant may not use the 
artful pleading doctrine to remove the state claim to federal 
court.4 
II. FACTS 
Plaintiffs were thirty-four investors!> who purchased stock in 
1. 813 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1987) (per Wiggins, J.; the other panel members were 
Schroeder, J., and Thompson, J.), petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3093 (U.S. July 17, 
1987) (No. 87-102). 
2. 452 U.S. 394 (1981). See infra notes 51-61 and accompanying text. 
3. 731 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1984). See infra notes 62-73 and accompanying text. 
4. Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1370, 1376. 
5. Sullivan v. First Affiliated Securities, 813 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1987). Twenty 
three of the investors, including Sullivan, were individuals; other investors were corpora-
tions, limited partnerships, pension plans and trusts. Id. at 1368. Most were California 
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Midwestern Companies.6 Defendants were a brokerage firm, 
First Affiliated Securities, Inc., its broker, and insiders of Mid-
western Companies (collectively "FAS-Midwestern").? The in-
vestors filed two suits against FAS-Midwestern. One suit was 
filed in California state court alleging claims under California 
state law.s A second suit was filed in federal court alleging sub-
stantially the same facts but asserting claims under federallaw.9 
The state action was filed in February of 198510 and the federal 
action was filed the following month, before serving summons in 
the state action.ll 
The defendants, FAS-Midwestern, removed the state action 
to federal court.12 The investors moved to remand the state ac-
tion to state court claiming that the federal court had no re-
moval jurisdiction over the state claim. IS The district court de-
nied the motion to remand.14 The district court reasoned that 
the investors, by filing their federal claim shortly after filing 
their state claim to redress essentially the same injury, had af-
firmatively elected to avail themselves of a federal forum. lIS The 
district court concluded that under Moitie16 and Salvesonl ? the 
plaintiff's contemporaneous filing of federal and state claims 
6. Id. at 1370. 
7. Id. First Affiliated Securities is a California firm and Midwestern Companies is a 
Missouri based corporation. Id. Insiders at Midwestern included its former officers, di-
rectors, accountants and attorneys. Id. 
8. Id. Investors' state claims included allegations of fraud, negligent misrepresenta-
tion and breach of fiduciary duty under California common law. Id. Investors also alleged 
violations of California's Blue Sky securities laws (Cal. Corp. Code §§ 1507(a), 2254, 
25401, and 25402 (West 1977». Id. at 1370. 
9. Id. The investors asserted claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as 
amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq., (1982) and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982). 
10. Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1370. 
11.Id. 
12. Id. at 1370-71. 
13. Id. at 1371. Although the investors apparently preferred to proceed in the state 
court under state law, they filed the federal action to obtain collateral discovery that 
could also be used in the state action and to protect against the possibility that the state 
court would lack personal jurisdiction over the Midwestern insiders. [d. at 1370 n.2. 
14. Id. at 1371. 
15.Id. 
16. Federated Department Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981). See infra notes 51-
63 and accompanying text. 
17. Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Ass'n, 731 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1984). See 
infra notes 64-76 and accompanying text. 
2
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amounted to "artful pleading,"l8 and that the plaintiff's state 
claim could be properly removed by the defendant to federal 
court.19 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the inves-
tors' petition for interlocutory appeal in order to consider 
whether or not the state claim should be remanded to state 
court.20 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. REMOVAL JURISDICTION 
The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. The 
Constitution limits the power of the judiciary to certain very 
specific classes of cases and controversies, including cases "aris-
ing under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United 
States."21 Congress created the lower federal courts, and by stat-
ute the federal courts have jurisdiction over those cases "arising 
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."22 
The meaning of the words "arising under" thus assumes both a 
constitutional dimension and a statutory dimension:23 Congress 
has no power 
under the Constitution to grant the federal courts jurisdiction 
over cases that do not "arise under" federal law; Congress did 
not intend, when enacting the federal question statute, to confer 
jurisdiction over cases not "arising under" federallaw.24 
18. Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1371. 
19. [d. 
20. [d. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the investors' petition to file an 
interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). [d. That section provides: 
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not 
otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opin-
ion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to 
which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and 
that an immediate appeal from the order may materially ad-
vance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so 
state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may 
thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from 
such order, if application is make to it within ten days after 
the entry of the order .... 
28 U.S.C § 1292(b) (1982). 
21. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). 
23. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 2.3, at 16-19 (1985) 
[hereinafter FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER]. 
24. [d. See generally Powers v. South Cent. United Food and Commercial Workers 
Unions, 719 F.2d 760, 763 n.1 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing numerous cases and commentaries 
3
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A plaintiff is said to be "master of his complaint."215 It is the 
plaintiff who assesses his claim and determines whether it arises 
under state law, federal law, or both.26 Ordinarily, if a plaintiff 
has a remedy under state law and also has a remedy under fed-
eral law he may choose to litigate in either forum, or he may 
pursue his claim in both the federal and state courts.27 
Removal jurisdiction permits a defendant to force the plain-
tiff to litigate certain actions in federal court, rather than in the 
state forum the plaintiff originally selected.28 The federal re-
moval statute provides that an action is removable only if it 
could have been brought originally in federal court.29 The re-
moval statute further provides that claims which arise under 
federal law are removable without regard to the citizenship or 
residence of the parties.30 
analyzing the "arising under" component of federal subject matter jurisdiction). See also 
Note, The Outer Limits of "Arising Under", 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 978 (1979) (a thorough 
discussion of "arising under" requirement for attachment of federal jurisdiction). 
25. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers' Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 22 
(1983) (removal of actions filed in state court only proper if a federal question appears 
on the face of a properly pleaded complaint). See also The Fair v. Kohler Die and 
Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913). (Holmes, J.) ("Of course the party who brings a 
suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon .•.. ") 
26. 1A J. MOORE & B. RINGLE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 0.160, at 231-32 (2d ed. 
1987). [hereinafter MOORE & RINGLE] 
27. [d. See also California v. California & Hawaiian Sugar Co., 588 F.2d 1270 (9th 
Cir. 1979). In Hawaiian Sugar, the plaintiff sought state court relief for antitrust viola-
tions. [d. at 1271. Defendant thereafter removed the action to federal court. [d. The 
court of appeals remanded the case to state court stating that there is nothing improper 
about pursuing state claims in state court while pursuing federal claims in federal court 
arising from the same operative facts. [d. at 1272, 1274. 
28. FRIEDENTHAL, KANE, & MILLER, supra note 23, § 2.11 at 57. See also C. WRIGHT, 
THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 212 (4th ed. 1983) (because removal jurisdiction is deriva-
tive, if the state court lacks jurisdiction over a case, the federal court cannot acquire 
jurisdiction through removal). 
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982) provides: "Except as otherwise expressly provided by 
Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of 
the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the 
defendants, to the district court of the United States ..•• " 
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982) provides: "Any other such action shall be removable 
only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citi-
zen of the State in which such action is brought." In Sullivan v. First Affiliated Securi-
ties, 813 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1987) the parties were not of completely diverse citizenship; 
therefore, the defendants claimed that the federal court had removal jurisdiction because 
the plaintiffs' state claim actually arose under federal law. [d. at 1371 and n.3. 
4
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol18/iss1/10
1988] FEDERAL JURISDICTION 181 
B. THE WELL-PLEADED COMPLAINT 
Normally, a defendant may only remove an action filed in 
state court to federal court based on a federal question if the 
federal question appears on the face of the plaintiff's properly 
pleaded complaint_31 Theoretically, removal jurisdiction could be 
viewed as a way for the federal court to hear what should have 
been before it in the first instance_32 If the plaintiff's well-
pleaded complaint shows a federal claim on its face, the defend-
ant will not be deprived of a federal forum just because the 
plaintiff happened to file the complaint in state court_33 
A long standing corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule 
is that the defendant cannot have the plaintiff's case removed to 
federal court simply because he asserts a federal defense, even if 
his entire defense is based on federallaw_34 Thus, the circum-
stances under which a defendant may remove an action involv-
ing a federal question from state court to federal court are very 
narrow, consisting almost exclusively of instances where the face 
31. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Sarkisian, 794 F.2d 754, 758 (2d Cir.) (ordinarily, 
defendant may remove an action to federal court only if a federal question appears on 
the face of a well-pleaded complaint), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 277 (1986). See Gully v. 
First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936) (applying what is now called the "well-pleaded 
complaint rule" in a removal context). Justice Cardozo wrote the opinion for the Su-
preme Court which said that a "genuine and present controversy, not merely a possible 
or conjectural one, must exist ... and the controversy must be disclosed upon the face of 
the complaint, unaided by the answer or by the petition for removal." (citations omitted) 
ld. at 113. The Supreme Court unanimously reaffirmed the well-pleaded complaint rule 
as fundamental to the determination of removal jurisdiction in Franchise Tax Board v. 
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983). 
32. FRIEDENTHAL, KANE, & MILLER, supra note 23, § 2.11 at 57. "In a case involving a 
claim raising an issue of federal law, removal equalizes the ability of both parties to have 
a federal question litigated in its 'natural' forum." ld. See also Norton, Recent Develop-
ment: Removal Doctrine Reaffirmed: Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Va-
cation Trust, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 557 (1985) (a survey of federal removal jurisdiction, the 
well-pleaded complaint rule in a removal context, and removability of state court actions 
for declaratory judgments). 
33. FRIEDENTHAL, KANE, & MILLER, supra note 23, § 2.11 at 57. 
34. Hunter v. United Van Lines 746 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 106 
S.Ct 180 (1985) (even though the defendants have a real and substantial interest in hav-
ing their preemption defense heard in federal court, such an interest is not a cognizable 
basis for federal removal jurisdiction). See also Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 
211 U.S. 149 (1908) (federal jurisdiction is lacking even if defense is based on federal 
law). The logic of denying removal jurisdiction to a defendant who raises a federal de-
fense has been questioned by various authorities including the American Law Institute, 
but Congress has not seen fit to permit removal unless the plaintiff relies on federal law. 
Sullivan v. First Affiliated Securities, 813 F.2d 1368, 1372 n.4 (9th Cir. 1987). 
5
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of the plaintiff's complaint discloses a cause of action arising 
under federallaw.315 The source of removal is purely statutory, 
and removal itself represents an intrusion upon the judicial 
power of the state courts.36 
c. THE ARTFUL PLEADING DOCTRINE 
Occasionally, a plaintiff may realize that his claim is one 
that arises under federal law but does not want to proceed in 
federal court.37 If the plaintiff characterizes his essentially fed-
erallaw claim as a state claim, omitting all mention of the appli-
cable federal law, and files the complaint in state court, the 
plaintiff has engaged in "artful pleading."3s If the defendant 
then attempts to remove what he believes to be a federal claim 
to federal court, the court will be permitted to look behind the 
face of the complaint. The court will seek to determine whether 
the real nature of the claim is federal regardless of the plaintiff's 
characterization.39 Thus, the artful pleading doctrine, which per-
mits the court to look behind the face of the complaint to deter-
mine the true nature of the plaintiff's claims, represents an ex-
ception to the well-pleaded complaint rule, which ordinarily 
35. Norton, supra note 32, at 557 and n.6. 
36. FRIEDENTHAL, KANE, & Mn.LER, supra note 23, § 2.11 at 57. 
37. Most cases where a plaintiff may try to circumvent the proper federal forum and 
file in state court involve situations where federal law completely preempts state law on 
a subject but if state law applied, plaintiff would have a remedy, perhaps a better one 
than is available under federal law. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Trans World Airlines, 702 F.2d 
189, 190 (9th Cir. 1980) (airline employee brought an action for wrongful demotion under 
state law, removed to federal court and dismissed); Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals Co., 615 
F.2d 1209, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 1980) (action in state court relating to employee-manage-
ment altercation preempted by Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 
(1982». The artful pleading doctrine has also been applied to permit federal court juris-
diction through removal in a few cases where plaintiff has already been denied a remedy 
under federal law but tries to get relief by stating the same claim in state court under 
state law. See, e.g., Federated Department Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981) (dis-
cussed infra at notes 51-63 and accompanying text); and Salveson v. Western States 
Bankcard Ass'n., 731 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1984) (discussed infra at notes 62-73 and ac-
companying text). 
38. Graf v. Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Ry. Co., 790 F.2d 1341, 1344 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(employee's state claim for unlawful termination and negligent failure to process a union 
grievance removed to federal court and dismissed). But cf. illinois v. Kerr-McGee Chem-
ical Corp., 677 F.2d 571, 575 (7th Cir.) (state action regarding disposal of radioactive 
waste not removable because it was not properly before the state court), cert. denied, 459 
U.S. 1049 (1982). 
39. 14A C. WRIGHT, A MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
3722,266-70 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER]. 
6
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permits removal only when the federal question appears on the 
face of the complaint."o 
Artful pleading has been colorfully described by various dis-
trict courts as "a federal case in state wrapping paper,""! "cloth-
ing a federal claim in state garb,""2 and a federal claim "in dis-
guise. "43 Artful pleading is said to be the plaintiff's 
characterization of a federal claim as a state claim."4 Artful 
pleading, however, must be carefully distinguished from the sit-
uation where a plaintiff has various separate claims, some arising 
under federal law and some arising under state law. If a plaintiff 
has causes of action under both state law and federal law, re-
membering that a plaintiff is "master of his complaint," the 
plaintiff is not engaging in artful pleading if he ignores the fed-
eral claim and proceeds solely under state law.45 Likewise, the 
plaintiff may ignore his state claims and proceed solely under 
federal law.46 Occasionally, the plaintiff will decide, as did the 
investors in Sullivan, to pursue both federal and state claims in 
separate actions."? The plaintiff's genuine state action is not sub-
ject to the federal court's removal jurisdiction because the plain-
tiff has not stated a federal cause of action on the face of his 
complaint, nor has the plaintiff attempted to engage in artful 
pleading by characterizing a federal claim as a state claim."8 
40. 1A MOORE & RINGLE, supra note 26, § 0.160, at 233. "The 'artful pleading doc-
trine' is a narrow exception to the ordinary rules of federal jurisdiction .... " Williams v. 
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 786 F.2d 928, 931 n.1 (9th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added). "The 
artful pleading doctrine is to be invoked only in exceptional circumstances as it raises 
difficult issues of state and federal relationships and often yields unsatisfactory results." 
Salveson, 731 F.2d at 1427. 
41. Graf, 790 F.2d at 1344. 
42. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Sarkisian, 794 F. 2d 754, 758 (2nd Cir.) (artful plead-
ing doctrine inapplicable where state law claim, filed after dismissal of a federal "RICO" 
action, does not contain elements essential to the federal claim), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 
277 (1986). 
43. Salveson, 731 F.2d at 1427. 
44. Powers v. South Cent. United Food and Commercial Workers Unions, 719 F.2d 
760, 765 (5th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff's state law claims for negligence, fraud, deceptive trade 
practices not preempted by federal law and removal was improper). 
45. 1A MOORE & RINGLE, supra note 26, § 0.160, at 231-32. "Plaintiff is, however, 
free to ignore the state question and pitch his claim on the federal ground, or ignore the 
federal ground and rely on the state ground." (citations omitted.) [d. 
46. [d. 
47. Sullivan v. First Affiliated Securities, 813 F. 2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1987). 
48. See California v. California & Hawaiian Sugar Co., 588 F.2d 1270, 1271-72 (9th 
Cir. 1978) (the court found nothing improper where plaintiff pursued both a state action 
for restraint of trade and a federal antitrust action arising out of the same operative 
7
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Artful pleading in the removal context is most often en-
countered when a plaintiff attempts to assert a claim under state 
law that has been preempted by federallaw.49 However, the art-
ful pleading doctrine is occasionally encountered in non-preemp-
tion settings as well. 50 The only acknowledgement of artful 
pleading by the Supreme Court in a non-preemption setting oc-
cured in Federated Department Stores v. Moitie. 51 In Moitie, 
plaintiff Brown filed suit against Federated Department Stores 
in federal court alleging violations of federal law (Brown I).52 
Moitie filed suit against the same defendants in state court 
(Moitie I).53 Moitie I was removed to federal court where both 
Brown I and Moitie I were dismissed.54 Moitie and Brown, rep-
resented by the same counsel, did not appeal but instead filed 
the same cases as new claims in state court (M oitie II and 
Brown II).55 Defendants removed Moitie II and Brown II to 
federal court and moved to dismiss on grounds of res judicata. 56 
The district court refused to remand Moitie II and Brown II to 
state court holding that the complaints, although artfully 
facts). 
49. See Hunter v. United Van Lines, 746 F.2d 635, 640-41 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 106 S.Ct. 180 (1985). Preemption removal is a matter of considerable controversy 
among the circuits. [d. Courts are struggling with the circumstances under which they 
will remove a state claim that was in reality an artfully pleaded federal claim when the 
subject matter of the claim has been preempted by federal law. [d. "[T]he better view is 
expressed by the Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits which have concluded that 
the assertion of a defense that federal law has preempted the state law upon which 
plaintiff relies does not create a federal question for purposes of the general removal 
statute." [d. at 641 (quoting MOORE & RINGLE, supra note 26, § 0.160[4]). See generally 
Comment, Federal Preemption, Removal Jurisdiction, and the Well-Pleaded Com-
plaint Rule, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 634 (1984) (analysis of removal jurisdiction based on 
defendant's allegations of federal preemption). 
50. Six relatively recent cases discuss the artful pleading doctrine leading to removal 
jurisdiction in a non-preemption setting: Sullivan v. First Affiliated Securities, 813 F.2d 
1368 (9th Cir. 1987) (the subject of this Note); Federated Department Stores v. Moitie, 
452 U.S. 394 (1981) (see infra notes 51-63 and accompanying text); Salveson v. Western 
States Bankcard Ass'n, 731 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1984) (see infra notes 64-76 and accom-
panying text; California v. California & Hawaiian Sugar Co., 588 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 
1979) (see supra note 27); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Sarkisian, 794 F.2d 754 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 277 (1986) (see supra note 31); and Reid v. Walsh, 620 F. Supp. 
930 (M.D. La. 1985). The Reid court reached a conclusion contrary to the one reached in 
Sullivan, holding that a state securities action can be removed to federal court because 
plaintiffs filed a federal securities action on the same facts. Reid, 620 F. Supp. at 932. 
51. 452 U.S. 394 (1981). 
52. [d. at 395-96. 
53. [d. at 395. 
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couched in terms of state law, were "essentially federal law 
claims. "67 The district court also concluded that the doctrine of 
res judicata required that Moitie II and Brown II be dismissed 
because Moitie II and Brown II involved the same parties, the 
same alleged offenses, and the same time periods as Moitie I and 
Brown 1.'58 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit refused to remand Moi-
tie II and Brown II to state court and affirmed the lower court's 
opinion that they were artfully pleaded state claims.69 However, 
the Ninth Circuit did reverse the district court's conclusion that 
the removed state actions were barred by res judicata.60 
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's refusal to 
bar Brown II and Moitie II based on res judicata.61 In a foot-
note, the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals' conclusion that the federal court had removal jurisdic-
tion over Brown II and Moitie II because the purported state 
claims were really artfully pleaded federal claims.62 Thus, al-
though artful pleading was suggested in the footnote as the ra-
tionale under which the federal court had jurisdiction over the 
57. ld. 
58. ld. at 396-97. 
59. Moitie v. Federated Department Stores, 611 F.2d 1267, 1268 (9th Cir. 1980) af-
firming removal with the following language: 
ld. 
Appellants first contend that removal was improper because 
they stated a valid state law claim. We disagree. The court 
below conectly held that the claims presented were federal in 
nature, arising solely from price fixing on defendants' part. In 
light of our disposition of this appeal, appellants will not quar-
rel with the result. 
60. Moitie, 452 U.S. at 397-98. Recent developments changing the law regarding 
Moitie's and Brown's underlying claims caused the Ninth Circuit to find that "simple 
justice" and "public poliey" required the doctrine of res judicata to give way and allow 
Moitie and Brown a second chance to have their claims considered, even though a final 
judgment of dismissal had been previously entered on the same claims. ld. 
6!. ld. at 394. "We granted certiorari, 449 U.S. 991 (1980), to consider the validity 
of the Court of Appeals' novel exception to the doctrine of res judicata." ld. at 398. 
A lengthy dissent by Justice Brennan points out that the theoretical underpinnings 
for the majority decision are far from clear. ld. at 408-10 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Brennan states: "The Court today nevertheless sustains removal of this action on 
the ground that 'at least some of the claims had a sufficient federal character to support 
removal.' ... I do not understand what the Court means by this. Which of the claims are 
federal in character? Why are the claims federal in character?" ld. at 409 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
62. ld. at 397 n.2. "[R]espondents had attempted to avoid removal jurisdiction by 
'artful[ly]' casting their 'essentially federal law claims' as state-law claims. We will not 
question here that finding." ld. 
9
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purported state claims, the Supreme Court was only concerned 
in its review of the case with the Ninth Circuit's "novel excep-
tion to the doctrine of res judicata. "63 
The Ninth Circuit, in Salveson v. Western States Bankcard 
Association,64 attempted to apply the artful pleading doctrine in 
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Moitie.615 In Salveson, 
the plaintiff filed a federal antitrust claim against the defend-
ants in federal court.66 The district court eventually granted de-
fendants' motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the 
suit was barred by the statute of limitations.6'1 Following entry 
of judgment, plaintiffs filed essentially the same claim in Cali-
63. [d. at 398. The significance of the Moitie decision with respect to removal based 
on the artful pleading doctrine has been sharply questioned. In Magic Chef, Inc. v. Inter-
national Molders and Allied Workers Union, 581 F. Supp. 772 (E.D. Tenn. 1983), de-
fendants argued for removal of state claims based upon Moitie saying that plaintiffs had 
artfully pleaded an essentially federal claim, and based upon federal preemption saying 
that federal law completely preempts state law in the field of labor relations. [d. at 774-
75. The court rejected the Moitie argument for removal in a footnote. [d. at 776 n.4. The 
footnote contains the following language: 
In that case, [Moitie) the Court held that the plaintiff's state 
law case was properly removed because "some of the claims 
had a sufficient federal character to support removal." One of 
the authorities upon which the Court relied has recently at-
tempted to explain this holding (after stating that "several of 
the Court's statements about removal .•• are difficult to un-
derstand."), 14 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER AND E. COOPER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3722 at 202 (1983) Pocket Part: 
"In brief, the Court's only intention in its footnote may 
have been a narrow one: to tip the balance in favor of defend-
ant's right to a federal forum and against plaintiff's right to be 
master of his claim in antitrust actions when the plaintiff al-
ready had availed himself of a federal forum and when his 
state claims as removed would be res judicata from the earlier 
federal decisions .••. " [d. at 203. 
It should be noted that the most recent edition of WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra 
note 39, § 3722 at 266 cites Moitie in its section regarding artful pleading with no com-
ment whatsoever, except to note that the decision quotes WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER. 
The court in Gold v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc., 580 F. Supp. 50, 53, n.1 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984), although most concerned about the master-of-the complaint rule, was 
blunt in its criticism of Moitie in dictum: "Although it is perhaps impossible intellectu-
ally to reconcile Moitie with established law, it seems proper, absent more direct and 
fuller consideration of the issue by the Court, to view the result as an aberration, neces-
sary in light of the unusual facts of that case." 
64. 731 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1984). 
65. [d. at 1425. 
66. [d. 
67. [d. at 1426. 
10
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fornia state court.6S Defendants then removed the state court 
suit to federal district court, and there moved to dismiss on the 
grounds of res judicata and statute of limitations.69 The district 
court concluded that the state claims were actually artfully 
pleaded federal claims and that res judicata properly applied.70 
Most of the claims were dismissed with prejudice.71 The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, but went further, ordering all 
of plaintiffs' state law claims dismissed with prejudice.72 The 
Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that Salveson's state 
claim was indeed an example of artful pleading as articulated in 
Moitie.73 The plaintiffs chose to proceed under federal law in 
federal court for four years repeatedly asserting a federal claim 
until it was dismissed.74 Having elected to proceed in a federal 
forum and pursue their claim under federal law, it was artful 
pleading to later recast the same claims as state claims.76 The 
Salveson court reasoned that removal jurisdiction in Moitie was 
founded upon the fact that in that case as well, the plaintiff had 
previously filed the claims as federal claims in federal court, 
thereby electing the federal court as the forum for resolving the 
dispute.76 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In Sullivan v. First Affiliated Securities,77 the Ninth Circuit 
noted that the investors filed claims in state court and in federal 
68. ld. The state law complaint contained seven caus~ of action including allega-
tions of common law fraud, fraudulent inducement to contract, misappropriation of 
plaintiffs' programs and ideas, interference with business relations and violation of the 
state antitrust statute. ld. 
69. ld. 
70. ld. 
71. ld. The first six causes of action were dismissed with prejudice on statute of 
limitations or res judicata grounds. ld. The last cause of action involving violation of the 
state antitrust statute was dismissed without prejudice for want of derivative jurisdiction 
upon removal to the federal court. ld. 
72. ld. at 1433. 
73. ld. at 1429. 
74. ld. 
75. ld. 
76. ld. "We agree [with the lower court] that the conclusion af artful pleading is 
properly drawn when the plaintiff 'by his own conduct, either by filing originally in fed-
eral court or by acceding to federal jurisdiction after removal, has made his claim a fed-
eral one.''' ld. (citation omitted). 
77. 813 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1987). 
11
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court arising out of the same core of operative facts.78 The de-
fendants, FAS-Midwestern, did not contend that federal law 
preempted the state claim.79 The defendants contended only 
that the investors engaged in "artful pleading" by filing claims 
in both state and federal court on the same operative facts.8o 
The Ninth Circuit stated that such an argument was previously 
rejected in California v. California & Hawaiian Sugar CO.81 The 
court then said that "[w]ere it not for ... Moitie ... , FAS-
Midwestern's argument would be groundless."82 The court ac-
knowledged that it had interpreted Moitie in its earlier 
Salveson83 decision, and allowed removal on the basis that the 
plaintiffs had elected to pursue their claim in a federal forum 
and therefore the state claim was simply their federal claim re-
cast under state law.84 
The Sullivan court observed that the Moitie court had ap-
proved removal of the state action to federal court in a footnote 
and as pointed out by the Brennan dissent in Moitie, "the task 
of divining Moitie's theoretical underpinnings has fallen to the 
lower courts and commentators."85 Both Moitie and Salveson 
applied the artful pleading doctrine in a non-preemption con-
text, and removal of the state action was permitted in both 
cases.86 The Sullivan court examined the possible theoretical ba-
ses for asserting removal jurisdiction in Moitie' and Salveson to 
determine if the investors' state claim could properly be re-
moved to federal court in light of those two cases.87 
The Sullivan court concluded that two possible justifica-
tions may be advanced for Moitie's use of the artful pleading 
doctrine: (1) plaintiff's election of a federal forum by suing in 
federal court (essentially the consent theory articulated in 
Salveson88), and (2) federal res judicata.89 
78. ld. at 1370. 
79. ld. at 1372-73. 
80. ld. at 1373. 
81. 588 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1979). See supra notes 27, 48. 
82. Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1373. 
83. Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Ass'n, 731 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1984). See 
supra notes 64-76. 
84. Sullivan, 813 F.2d. at 1373. 
85. ld. 
86. I d. at 1373-74. 
87. ld. at 1373-76. 
88. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. 
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The Sullivan court described five flaws in basing Moitie's 
removal jurisdiction on an election of forum rationale. (1) The 
Supreme Court did not articulate the election theory in Moitie, 
and that approach had never been accepted as justifying re-
moval.90 (2) The election approach is inconsistent with the re-
moval statute.91 (3) The election justification does not conform 
to traditional notions of removal under the artful pleading doc-
trine-the investors have not failed to plead necessary federal 
law.92 (4) Acceptance of an election theory would expand re-
moval jurisdiction to a significant number of state cases in which 
the plaintiff has filed a parallel federal case, contrary to princi-
ples of federalism.93 (5) Attempts to place limits on the election 
rationale have been unsatisfactory.9ol 
The Sullivan court concluded that the better view is that 
removal jurisdiction in Moitie rests on the existence of a res 
judicata defense.911 Moitie can be fairly construed as "permitting 
removal only of state claims filed to circumvent the res judicata 
impact of a federal judgment."96 
89. Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1373. 
90. Id. at 1374. 
91. Id. Because "the state and federal claims were filed separately, the state claims 
are not pendent, nor within original federal jurisdiction, and do not arise under federal 
law." Id. 
92. Id. at 1374-75. The state claims are created and governed by state law, even 
though they are based on the same operative facts as plaintiffs' federal claims, and in the 
absence of preemption cannot be characterized as federal claims. Id. 
93. Id. at 1375. 
94. Id. The Sullivan court noted that the Second Circuit has allowed removal after 
the Moitie decision if the state claim and the federal claim are "substantially similar", 
and if the plaintiff first pursued his claim in federal court thereby electing a federal 
forum. Id. See Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Sarkisian, 794 F.2d 754, cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 
277 (1986). In Sarkisian, plaintiff first filed a RICO claim in federal court, which was 
dismissed. Id. at 756-57. Plaintiff then filed a state action based on the same operative 
facts alleging various breaches of state law. Id. at 757. The Second Circuit found that the 
state action was not "substantially similar" to the federal action because ihe state action 
did not allege "a pattern of racketeering activity" or operation of an "enterprise," as did 
the federal action. Id. at 761. The Sullivan court argued that "substantial similarity of 
claims seems unsound" as the presence of shared elements does not mean that the state 
claim arises under federal law. Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1375. The Sullivan court further 
argued that the order of filing should make no difference if the rationale for removal 
rests upon an election of forums rationale. "Regardless of the filing order, the plaintiff 
will have elected to use the federal forum .... " Id. 
95. Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1376. 
96. Id. The court also noted that its new interpretation of the basis for removal 
jurisdiction in Moitie (that the federal courts have removal jurisdiction when the state 
claim would be barred by the doctrine of res judicata) is subject to criticism. Id. If the 
13
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Applying the foregoing rationale to Sullivan, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the investors' state claims should be remanded to 
state court.97 Their state claims were not barred by res judicata 
because a final judgment had not been entered on the federal 
action.98 The investors' state claims were not preempted by fed-
eral law and therefore could be properly pursued under state 
law.99 The state law claims did not fall within the federal court's 
original jurisdiction because they were never joined with the 
plaintiffs' federal claims.loo The federal court could not exercise 
pendent jurisdiction over the state law claims because the plain-
tiff did not choose to file the state claims in the same complaint 
as the federal claims.lol The plaintiff was therefore permitted to 
assert parallel state and federal claims, and removal jurisdiction 
did not attach to the state claims under the "artful pleading 
doctrine.mo2 
V. CRITIQUE 
The Ninth Circuit significantly elucidated the applicability 
of the artful pleading doctrine in the removal context in Sulli-
van v. First Affiliated Securities. lOS Sullivan offered the court 
an opportunity to (1) define the basis for removal jurisdiction in 
Moitie;lo4 (2) step away from the court's previous explanation of 
"state court is competent to apply federal res judicata in the state lawsuit," why should 
the existence of a res judicata defense allow the case to be removed to federal court? Id. 
Nevertheless, the Sullivan court proceeded to reason: 
The federal judgment would ordinarily preclude the plaintiff 
from reIitigating any federal or state claim arising out of the 
same operative facts. A purported state claim based on those 
facts would be in effect the same federal claim against which 
the judgment had been entered. The removing court could 
thus recharacterize the state claim as an artfully pleaded fed-
eral claim filed to circumvent the res judicata effect of the fed-
eral judgment. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
97.Id. 
98.Id. 
99. Id. The defendants never contended that federal law preempted plaintiffs' state 
law claims. Id. at 1372-73. 
100. Id. at 1376. 
101. Id. at 1376 n.8. 
102. Id. at 1376. 
103. 813 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1987). 
104. Id. at 1373-76. 
14
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the theoretical basis for Moitie as enunciated in Salvesonl015; • 
and (3) to impliedly reassert the preeminence of the well-
pleaded complaint rule in the Ninth Circuit, carving out only a 
narrow exception from it in the form of the artful pleading 
doctrine. lOB 
A careful reading of the Moitie decision gives credence to 
the notion that "the task of divining Moitie's theoretical under-
pinnings has fallen to the lower courts and commentators."I07 
Although Moitie clearly applied res judicata to the state claims 
filed after final judgment was rendered on the federal claim, the 
basis upon which the federal court approved removal jurisdic-
tion was not articulated. lOB Because the defendants in Sullivan 
sought to apply the artful pleading doctrine to permit removal 
in a non-preemption setting, a rationale for the Supreme Court's 
use of the artful pleading doctrine to permit removal in Moitie 
was critical.lo9 Even though both Sullivan and Moitie involved 
artful pleading and removal in a non-preemption setting, it must 
be noted that the facts of the two cases are very dissimilar. In 
Sullivan the plaintiff asserted parallel state and federal claims, 
and pursued both claims independently from the beginning of 
litigation.llo In Moitie the plaintiff did not object to federal ju-
risdiction over his lawsuit, and only after his federal lawsuit was 
dismissed did he file an action in state court based on the same 
facts.lll It is ironic that the Ninth Circuit struggled in Sullivan 
with the rationale underlying removal in Moitie. The Supreme 
Court in its footnote approving removal in Moitie simply agreed 
with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which had agreed with 
the district court that the claims presented were "federal in 
nature. "I 12 
105.Id. 
106. Id. at 1375-76. 
107. Id. at 1373. 
108. Federated Department Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 397 n.2. (1981). 
109. Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1373. The Second Circuit in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. 
Sarkisian, 794 F.2d 754, 760 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 277 (1986) was faced with 
the same problem and gave its own interpretation to the rationale for removal in Moitie. 
See supra note 94. 
110. Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1370-71. 
111. Moitie, 452 U.S. at 395-96. 
112. Moitie, 452 U.S. at 397 n.2. "The Court of Appeals also affirmed the District 
Court's conclusion that Brown II was properly removed to federal court, reasoning that 
the claims presented were 'federal in nature.' We agree that at least some of the claims 
had a sufficient federal character to support removal." Id. 
15
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The Ninth Circuit once before addressed the rationale un-
derlying Moitie's removal jurisdiction. In Salveson v. Western 
States Bankcard Association1I8 the Ninth Circuit reasoned that 
removal in Moitie rested on an election of forum rationale.1I4 In 
Salveson the court was faced with a case very similar to Moitie. 
Because the Supreme Court, in Moitie, had approved removal 
under the artful pleading doctrine when the plaintiff filed a suit 
in state court after a judgment had already been rendered in 
plaintiff's federal suit, it would seem that the basis for removal 
was not so important as the outcome-that the state action 
must be banned by the doctrine of res judicata.lu> In Sullivan 
however, plaintiff had been pursuing both his federal court ac-
tion and his state claims from the beginning of the lawsuit.1I6 If 
the Moitie decision really meant that a defendant could remove 
a state action to federal court whenever plaintiff pursued a fed-
eral remedy, then removal based upon an election of forum the-
ory could serve as the rationale for removing state claims to fed-
eral court whenever the plaintiff also chose to pursue a parallel 
federal claim in federal court, precisely the position taken by the 
defendant in Sullivan.ll7 
The Sullivan court was correct to retreat from any interpre-
tation of Moitie that would permit such an enormous expansion 
of removal jurisdiction and a departure from settled precedent 
permitting concurrent progress of parallel lawsuits through the 
federal and state courts. lIS Because an election of forum ration-
ale1I9 could arguably expand removal jurisdiction well beyond 
113. Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Ass'n, 731 F.2d 1423, (9th Cir. 1984). 
114. [d at 1425-29. The facts in Salveson were very similar to those in Moitie. [d. 
After summary judgment was entered against plaintiff's federal law claim, plaintiff filed 
an action in state court based on the same facts. [d. The state action was removed to 
federal court and dismissed. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the federal court had 
removal jurisdiction because plaintiff elected to proceed in federal court, therefore the 
state court action really arose under federal law. [d. 
115. Salveson, 731 F.2d at 1432. "We view the Supreme Court's holding as standing 
at least for the proposition that if a state claim is found on removal to be an artfully 
pleaded federal claim which was previously before the federal court and was dismissed, 
then res judicata is to be applied." [d. 
116. Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1370. 
117. [d. at 1374. 
118. See generally Twitchell, Characterizing Federal Claims: Preemption, Removal, 
and the Arising-Under Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 812 
(surveying removal jurisdiction and characterizing it as being narrowly construed with 
courts giving deference to the well-pleaded complaint rule). 
119. Salveson, 731 F.2d at 1429 (quoting the lower court decision in the same case: 
16
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what the Supreme Court envisioned when it decided Moitie, the 
Sullivan court was wise to step away from its reasoning in 
Salveson.120 What the court has effectively done in Sullivan is to 
limit Moitie to its facts, and to permit removal only when plain-
tiff's state law claim would be barred by res judicata.l2l Limiting 
the effect of Moitie appears to be entirely appropriate in light of 
Moitie's poorly defined theoretical underpinnings.122 By limiting 
Moitie to its facts, the court also wisely limited the artful plead-
ing doctrine to a narrow exception to the well-pleaded complaint 
rule.123 The narrow exception means that the Ninth Circuit will 
continue to look only to the face of the complaint to determine 
the existence of a federal claim. Removal under the artful plead-
ing exception will continue to be appropriate only where plain-
tiff's claim is completely preempted by federal law or when the 
state claim is barred by res judicata.124 
The Sullivan court noted that if the federal court's removal 
jurisdiction was broadened to permit removal of state claims 
pursued simultaneously with federal actions, judicial economy 
would be served by hearing as many of the plaintiff's claims to-
gether as possible.1215 The court further noted that "complex 
state and federal actions proceeding simultaneously against the 
same parties [may] pose grave problems in the management of 
litigation."126 The court correctly concluded, however, that is-
sues of judicial economy and litigation management are beyond 
the scope of the removal statute and the removal jurisdiction of 
the federal courts.127 Other means are available to courts to co-
ordinate duplicative state and federal litigation. Procedures 
Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Ass'n, 525 F. Supp. 566, 577 (N.D. Cal. 1981»: 
"[Tlhe conclusion of artful pleading is properly drawn when the plaintiff 'by his own 
conduct, either by filing originally in federal court or by acceding to federal jurisdiction 
after removal, has made his claim a federal one.' " 
120. Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1374. 
121. Id. at 1376. 
122. Id. at 1373. 
123. Id. at 1375-76. 
124. Id. at 1375 (quoting Salveson). The artful pleading doctrine should be invoked 
"only in exceptional circumstances." Salveson, 731 F.2d at 1427. 
125. Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1374. Under the particular facts of this case, parallel state 
and federal claims may have led to some judicial economy by avoiding duplicative dis-
covery. Reply Brief for Appellant at 7-10, Sullivan v. First Affiliated Securities, 813 F.2d 
1368 (9th Cir. 1987) (No. 85-2961). 
126. Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1377 (quoting California v. California & Hawaiian Sugar 
Co., 588 F.2d 1270, 1273 (9th Cir. 1979». 
127. Id. at 1377. 
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available include stays of either the state or the federal claims to 
permit litigation of one type of claim at a time,128 injunctions,129 
and the doctrine of res judicata. ISO 
VI. CONCLUSION 
By holding that the artful pleading doctrine as articulated 
in Federated Department Stores v. Moitie1S1 and Salveson v. 
Western States Bankcard Association1S2 does not support re-
moval of an independent, parallel state claim to federal court, 
the Ninth Circuit has moved to limit the artful pleading doc-
trine. Removal is permitted only in a narrow range of cases that 
are either completely preempted by federal law or that have 
been precluded by federal res judicata. ISS The court's inquiry 
into potential removal jurisdiction will continue to begin with 
the traditional "face of the complaint" rule. 1M The court has 
narrowly defined its willingness to "look behind the complaint" 
and apply the artful pleading doctrine. 
Susan H. Handelman * 
128. See generally Note, Federal Court Stays and Dismissals in Deference to Par-
allel State Court Proceedings: The Impact of Colorado River, 44 U. CHL L. REV. 641 
(1977) (concerning when federal courts should stay actions before them in order to pro-
tect parties from having to litigate actions in state and in federal courts concurrently). 
129. See, e.g., Golden v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 786 F.2d 1425, 1427 (9th Cir. 1986). 
See generally Annotation, Stay of Action in Federal Court Until Determination of Sim-
ilar Action Pending in State Court,_ 5 AL.R. FED. 10 (1970) (collection of cases where 
courts have considered whether and when they can order a stay of action in federal court 
to allow determination of a similar action in state court). 
130. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 2d § 31.32 (1986) describes the role of res 
judicata as follows: "Federal law, however, generally permits multiple actions between 
the same parties to be pursued simultaneously, whether in other federal courts or in 
state courts, until a judgment is obtained that will be given effect in other cases under 
the doctrines of issue preclusion or claim preclusion." Id. 
131. 452 U.S. 394 (1981). 
132. 731 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1984). 
133. Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1376. 
134. See supra note 31. 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1989. 
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